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1, 3, 10

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended), which is from a final
Partial Summary Judgment entered by the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether American's cause of action against Bonneville for

enforcement of a written guaranty agreement executed by Bonneville
is subject to the statute of limitations for a deficiency action.
2.

Whether Bonneville may assert the "one-action rule",

codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1, as a defense where the mixed
collateral loan obligation was secured by personal property and a
guaranty agreement in addition to a deed of trust on real property.
3.

Whether the Guaranty Agreement, which expressly states

that, upon default of the primary obligors, American need not first
exhaust any other collateral or security or remedy before pursuing
Bonneville is an absolute guaranty.
4.

Whether Bonneville may assert defenses which it expressly

waived in the Guaranty
A.

Whether

Agreement.
the

alleged

discharge

of

the

primary

obligors because of Americanfs failure to exhaust all remedies
discharges Bonneville where the Guaranty Agreement expressly
waives any requirement of exhaustion.
B.

Whether

a

separate

operating

loan

transaction

between the primary obligors and American primarily secured by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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collateral different from that pledged under the initial loan
transaction can be construed to be a material modification of
the Guaranty Agreement.
C.

Whether

primarily

secured

a separate
by

operating

different

loan transaction,

collateral

and

to

which

Bonneville was not a party, can be construed to be a novation
of the Guaranty Agreement.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent American Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter
"American") filed an action on or about April 26, 1989, in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah,

naming

C. John

Gibson,

Lewis E.

Young

and

Appellant

Bonneville Industries, Inc. (hereinafter "Bonneville") as defendants.

(R. 2-42.) American's cause of action against Bonneville

sought to enforce the terms of a written guaranty agreement
executed by Bonneville on October 28, 1983.

(R. 3-5.)

Following service of the Complaint, Bonneville filed an Answer
and discovery proceeded.

(R. 46-52.)

On November 29, 1989,

American filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Bonneville.
(R. 58-74.)

Bonneville subsequently filed a cross Motion for

Summary Judgment against American.

(R. 75-133.)

On April 23,

1990, after hearing oral argument on both motions, the trial court,
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, entered an Order granting
American's Motion for Summary Judgment against Bonneville as to the
2
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issue of Bonneville's liability on the guaranty, but reserving the
issue of the amount of damages for subsequent determination.

The

trial court also denied Bonneville's Motion for Summary Judgment
against American,

(R. 216-218.)

In its ruling, the trial court

expressly found as follows:
The one-action rule found at Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-37-1 does not apply to the enforcement by
plaintiff of defendant Bonneville Industries,
Inc.' s Guaranty in this case, the performance
of defendants' obligations having been secured
by a deed of trust on real property, an unconditional and absolute guaranty agreement and a
perfected security interest in personal
property. (R. 217.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 28, 1983, American made a loan to Gibson
Cryogenics,

Inc.

individually.

("Gibson

Cryogenics")

and

C. John

Gibson,

(R. 71.) The original principal amount of the loan

was $1,100,000.00 and the loan monies were used to finance the
purchase of the real property from which C. John Gibson and Gibson
Cryogenics conducted business.

(R. 175.)

The seller of the real

property was Bonneville, and $510,000.00 of the loan proceeds were
paid directly to Bonneville, while $572,547.38 of the loan proceeds
were paid to First Security Bank of Utah to pay off Bonneville's
loan.

(R. 175.) The loan was partially secured by a Deed of Trust

on the improved real property, the proceeds thereof and the rents
derived therefrom, and was further partially secured by a perfected
security interest in personal property which included various
3
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pieces of equipment.

(R. 71.)

In addition, the described loan

("the mixed collateral loan11) was guaranteed by Bonneville pursuant
to a written Guaranty Agreement dated October 28, 1983, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Addendum "A".

(R. 71.)

Gibson Cryogenics and C. John Gibson eventually defaulted
under the terms of the loan by failing to make payments when due.
In

1986, Gibson

Cryogenics

filed

a

petition

in

bankruptcy.

American moved for relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy
case, and its motion was granted on March 16, 1988.

(R. 71.)

On

August 8, 1988, a foreclosure sale was had on the real property
which partially secured the loan obligation, and American was
subsequently able to realize the sum of $283,000.00 from the sale
of the real property.

(R. 72.)

The personal property collateral

which was a significant part of the security

for the mixed

collateral loan was also sold, and the sum of $225,000.00 was
realized.

All monies received from the sale of the real property

and personal property were applied to and reduced

the mixed

collateral loan obligation guaranteed by Bonneville.

However, a

deficiency remains owing on the loan obligation guaranteed by
Bonneville after liquidation of all of the security, both realty
and personalty, and application of the proceeds to the indebtedness.

(R. 72-73.)

Moreover, although Bonneville made inquiry as

to whether American would sell the Promissory Note and Deed of
Trust to it, and American indicated its willingness to sell, at no
time has American received an offer to purchase from Bonneville.
4
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In addition to the described 1983 mixed collateral loan, in
January of 1985, American made a revolving operating loan to Gibson
Cryogenics and C. John Gibson in the original principal amount of
$400,000.00.

This revolving operating loan was secured primarily

by accounts receivable generated by Gibson Cryogenics.

(R. 175.)

Most of the payments received by American were direct payments from
Gibson Cryogenics customers to American and as the revolving loan
was paid down, Gibson Cryogenics was permitted to reborrow the
funds for continuing operating costs. (R. 175.) Although the 1985
revolving operating loan, primarily secured by accounts receivable,
was secondarily secured by the real property which also secured the
1983 mixed collateral loan, no payments recpWed by American on the
mixed collateral loan were credited to the revolving operating
loan.

Moreover, no payments received on the revolving operating

loan were applied on the mixed collateral loan, nor could they be,
because the mixed collateral loan was not secured by receivables
generated by Gibson Cryogenics and the loan documentation did not
permit American to apply account receivable monies to the 1983
obligation.

(R. 175-176.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
American properly brought an action against Bonneville seeking
to

enforce

a written

guaranty

executed

by

guaranteed payment of a mixed collateral loan.

Bonneville

which

American's claim

against Bonneville is not barred by the statute of limitations
5
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applicable to deficiency actions, nor did Americanfs election to
foreclose on the real and personal property pledged as collateral
for the loan, thereby reducing the amount for which Bonneville was
liable, in any way discharge Bonneville's obligations as guarantor.
Moreover, since the relevant loan was secured by both realty and
personalty, the "one-action rule" is not applicable.
The Guaranty Agreement executed by Bonneville is an absolute
and unconditional guaranty, and is enforceable according to its
express terms. The defense of discharge of the primary obligtors,
which was waived by Bonneville in the guaranty, is therefore not
now available to Bonneville even if there were a factual basis for
it.

In addition, there is no basis for Bonneville's allegations

that a separate loan transaction between American and the primary
obligors constituted a material modification of the guaranty, or
resulted in a novation.

Finally, there are no genuine issues of

material fact which would have precluded entry of summary judgment
in favor of American on the legal issue of Bonneville's liability
as guarantor.

ARGUMENT
The standard for appellate review of a trial court's entry of
summary judgment as a matter of law is that of correctness, and no
particular deference is afforded to the trial court's view of the
law.

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah

1989).

Similarly, the standard

for appellate review of the

6
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unambiguous language of a written agreement is also a correctness
standard,

Bettinqer v. Bettinqer, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990).

Applying the correctness standard to the trial courtfs determination under the undisputed material facts of, and law applicable to,
this case, it is clear that the trial court properly entered
summary judgment in favor of American.

I.
AMERICAN'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
BONNEVILLE IS NOT A DEFICIENCY ACTION
AND ONLY SEEKS TO ENFORCE THE WRITTEN
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY BONNEVILLE.
Bonneville

incorrectly

characterizes

Americanfs

cause of

action against Bonneville as an action for a deficiency arising
after foreclosure.

Bonneville then argues that American's action

is barred because Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32

(1953 as amended)

provides a three-month limitation period within which a deficiency
action

must

be

brought.

(Appellant's

Brief

at

14-16.)

Bonneville's argument is without merit. Section 57-1-32 relates to
collection of a deficiency against a mortgagor after extrajudicial
sale of real property pledged as collateral.

Bonneville is a

guarantor, not the mortgagor, and did not pledge the real property
as security

for its obligation

as a guarantor.

Therefore,

American's claim against Bonneville is not barred by § 57-1-32.
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that a guaranty is an
unsecured liability separate and distinct from a mortgage.
7
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In

First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Gaiqe, 765 P.2d 683 (Idaho
1988), the Court held that Idaho's anti-deficiency statute did not
protect a guarantor from liability.

Similarly, in Riverside

National Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980), the Court
ruled

that

the obligation

of

a guaranty

is

independent

and

separately enforceable, so that a guarantor is not automatically
discharged by a creditor's failure to seek a deficiency.

See also

Mandan Security Bank v. Heinzohn, 320 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1982) (North
Dakota anti-deficiency statute did not apply to the guarantors,
since the guaranty was a separate liability); Victory Highway
Village,

Inc. v.

Weaver,

480

F.

Supp.

71

(D. Minn.

1979)

(guaranties were absolute and unconditional and provided a wholly
distinct cause of action against the guarantor, entirely separate
from a deficiency action against the mortgagor).
In addition, the language of the Guaranty Agreement at issue
specifically provides that, although American had no obligation to
do so, if it chose to proceed with foreclosure pursuant to the
terms of the Deed of Trust, it would "not be required to prosecute
or institute proceedings to recover any deficiency as a condition
of payment hereunder or endorsement hereof."

11 4.

Since American

had no obligation to file a deficiency action against C. John
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics as a prerequisite to seeking recovery
on the guaranty from Bonneville, it would require this Court to
violate the clear terms of the guaranty to find that American's
claim against Bonneville is somehow barred by the deficiency
8
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statute of limitations.

American's claim against Bonneville is

not, nor could it be, a deficiency claim, but rather seeks enforcement

of

the express

terms

of the separate written

Guaranty

Agreement executed by Bonneville,
Bonneville also argues that American has discharged C. John
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics by failing to seek a deficiency
judgment against them and has therefore released Bonneville from
its obligations under the Guaranty Agreement.
at 16-19.)

(Appellant's Brief

Again, Bonneville ignores the plain and undisputed

language of the guaranty and tortures the facts.

American could

not have filed a deficiency action against Gibson Cryogenics
because of the stay imposed by its bankruptcy filing.

But even

assuming, arguendo, that American could have pursued a deficiency
against C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics and was obligated to
do so, it is clear that no such obligation would run to Bonneville.
The express terms of the written guaranty provide as follows:
[N]o act or omission of any kind by
Beneficiary [American] shall affect or impair
this Guaranty, and Beneficiary shall have no
duties to the Guarantor [Bonneville]. H 10.

Bonneville also erroneously relies on Nevada Bank of
Commerce v. Esquire Real Estate, 468 P.2d 22 (Nev. 1970) and on
McGill v. Idaho Bank and Trust, 632 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1981) in
support of its position. The first case discusses only novation,
and the second case holds that where a guarantor contractually
waives the defense of release of the principal debtor, as did the
Bonneville, the guarantor will remain liable even though the
defense of release might otherwise have been available.
9
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Thus, American's determination not to, or inability to, pursue a
deficiency action against C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics in
no way affects enforcement of the Guaranty Agreement against
Bonneville.

II.
THE "ONE-ACTION RULE" DOES NOT
PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF A
GUARANTY ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
The "one-action rule", set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1
(1953 as amended), by its terms applies only to debts or rights
"secured solely by mortgage upon real estate."

It is undisputed

that the obligation guaranteed by Bonneville, the mixed collateral
loan, was secured by a trust deed on real estate, rents and
proceeds, certain other valuable personal property and the Guaranty
Agreement at issue. As the trial court correctly found, the mixed
collateral loan guaranteed by Bonneville was not secured solely by
a mortgage upon real estate and the one-action rule accordingly
does not apply.
This Court has previously held that the one-action rule
applies only to actions between mortgagors and mortgagees and does
not extend to third parties.

Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Nephi

Processing Plant, Inc., 323 P.2d 266 (Utah 1958). Furthermore, the
written Guaranty Agreement executed by Bonneville is not a debt
secured

by real property

unsecured obligation.

at all, but rather

is a separate,

Even in the State of California, where a
10
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strong anti-deficiency sentiment prevails, courts have held that

the one-action
guarantor.

rule does not prevent a direct action against a true

United Cal. Bank v. Maltzman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 41, 118

Cal. Rptr, 299 (Cal, App, 1974).

Bonnevillefs arguments relating

to the one-action rule thus fail to recognize the fact that the
"one-action rule" applies neither to the mixed collateral loan nor
to the separate Guaranty Agreement.

III.
THE WRITTEN GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED
BY BONNEVILLE ON OCTOBER 28, 1983
IS AN ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY.
The trial court correctly found that the Guaranty Agreement at
issue is "an unconditional and absolute guaranty agreement."

In

the case of Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741
(Utah 1982), this Court articulated the difference between an
absolute guaranty of payment and a mere guaranty of collection:
[A] guarantee of payment is absolute, and the
guaranteed party need not fix its losses by
pursuing its remedies against the debt or the
security before proceeding directly against
the guarantor. (Emphasis in original, cites
omitted.)
In contrast, a guarantee of collection is
conditional only, the guarantor's liability
being dependent upon the creditorfs first
exhausting its remedies against the debtor and
any security before resorting to action
against the guarantor. (Emphasis in original,
cites omitted.)

11
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Id. at 743. See also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987).
The written guaranty executed by Bonneville expressly provides
that Bonneville "[unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the
due and punctual payment of the principal of the Note, the interest
thereon

and

any

other

thereon • . . .If f 1.

monies

due

or which

may

become

due

The Guaranty Agreement further states that

it may be enforced by American without the necessity of "first
resorting to or exhausting any other security or collateral or
without first having recourse to the Note or any of the property
covered by the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument
securing the Note. . .f!. 11 4.

The guaranty finally specifically

provides that the guarantor's obligations thereunder "shall be
absolute and primary and shall be complete and binding upon this
Guaranty being executed by it and subject to no condition precedent
or otherwise."

11 11. Under Utah law then, the Guaranty Agreement

at issue is an absolute guaranty of payment since it is in no way
conditional.
Despite the express language of the guaranty and the applicable Utah law, Bonneville argues that by electing to foreclose on
the real and personal property, American treated the guaranty as a
"collateral guaranty".

(Appellant's Brief at 22.) The language of

the Guaranty Agreement itself is dispositive, however, in that the
terms of paragraph

4 of the guaranty expressly provide that

American's determination to foreclose and mitigate its losses in no
12
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way affects Bonneville's

liability

as an absolute guarantor.

Moreover, this Court has previously

held that a guarantor's

"independent obligation" under an absolute guaranty is not affected
by the creditor's actions in pursuance of the debtor:
The fact that the creditor obtained a judgment
against the debtor but failed to allege execution on that judgment or exhaustion of his
remedies against the debtor or the security
does not alter the nature of the guarantor's
independent obligation as a guarantor.
Strevell-Paterson at 744.
It is thus clear that Bonneville's guaranty is absolute and
that American was not required to first liquidate the available
collateral prior to seeking enforcement of the guaranty, although
American in fact did so to Bonneville's benefit and reduced the
amount recoverable from Bonneville under the guaranty by the amount
of monies received from the sale of the real and personal property
collateral.

IV.
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE
ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS TERMS.
Under Utah law, the specific terms of a guaranty are enforceable.

For example, express waivers in a guaranty are enforceable

against the guarantor.

In Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way

Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals stated that a guarantor may waive its right to
claim relief based upon an impairment of collateral.
13
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Ld. at 109.

Similarly, in Continental

Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security

Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985), this Court upheld a
waiver

in

a

guaranty

which

read,

"[T]he

liability

of

the

Guarantor(s) shall not be affected, released or exonerated by
release or surrender of any security held for payment of any debts
hereinbefore mentioned . . .".

In Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.

Hydroswift Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), this Court also upheld
the express terms of an absolute guaranty and ruled that the
guarantor was liable, despite its claim that the creditor's failure
to repossess and sell the collateral operated as a release of its
guaranty.
In the case at bar, Bonneville seeks to now assert several
defenses which it previously and expressly waived at the time it
executed the Guaranty Agreement in 1983; namely, release of the
primary obligors, material modification and novation.

A.

The alleged discharge of C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics
is irrelevant to Bonneville's liability as guarantor.
The terms of the Guaranty Agreement specifically and unequivo-

cally provide that Bonneville's liability is not conditioned upon
any action taken by American against the principal obligors, but
rather attaches at the time C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics
default on the loan obligation guaranteed.
Guaranty Agreement, Bonneville

In paragraph 1 of the

"unconditionally and absolutely

guarantees the due and punctual payment" of the loan obligation; in
14
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paragraph 2, Bonneville agrees to remain liable until C. John
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics fully perform their obligations under
the loan agreements, "notwithstanding any act, omission or thing
which

might

otherwise

operate

as

a

legal

discharge

of

the

guarantor"; in paragraph 4 Bonneville agrees that the guaranty can
be enforced by American without resorting first to the security or
collateral, but if American determines to proceed with foreclosure,
it shall not be required to prosecute or institute proceedings to
recover a deficiency as a condition of payment under or endorsement
of the guaranty; in paragraph 10 Bonneville agrees that no act or
omission of any kind by American shall affect or impair the
guaranty and that American shall have no duties to Bonneville; in
paragraph 11 Bonneville agrees that its obligations as guarantor
are absolute and are complete and binding upon execution of the
guaranty and "subject to no conditions precedent or otherwise";
and, finally, in paragraph 15 Bonneville agrees that the obligations undertaken in the guaranty are continuing and irrevocable
until the mixed collateral loan and related charges have been
satisfied.
In light of the unambiguous written terms of the Guaranty
Agreement, Bonnevillefs attempts to now raise various affirmative
defenses alleging that it has been released from its expressly
undertaken guaranty obligations lack merit. Even if such defenses
were supported

by the facts, which they are not, no action
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undertaken by American has in any way resulted in the release of
Bonneville.

B.

The subsequent revolving operating loan of 1985 was not a
material modification of the Guaranty Agreement,
Bonneville

also alleges that because the

1985 revolving

operating loan was secondarily secured by the real property which
partially

secured

the

1983 mixed

collateral

loan, a greater

financial risk was placed upon Bonneville than was originally
contemplated, resulting in a material modification of the Guaranty
Agreement.
and

(Appellant's Brief at 19-20.) Once again, the express

undisputed

language

of

the

guaranty

provides

otherwise.

Paragraph 12 of the agreement states that the terms of the guaranty
may not be changed or modified in any way except by a writing
executed by American, and it is clear that the 1985 revolving
operating loan was not, nor was it intended to be, a modification
of the mixed collateral loan.

In addition, Bonneville substan-

tially mischaracterizes the facts in order to make its argument
appear plausible.

In truth, the revolving operating loan of 1985

was a completely separate loan transaction only marginally related
to the loan obligation which Bonneville guaranteed.

The revolving

loan was secured primarily by accounts receivable and no payments
received on the revolving operating loan were applied on the 1983
mixed collateral loan, or vice versa.
treated the loans separately.

At all times American

Thus, the $3 million referred to by
16
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Bonneville in its brief as being monies which should have been
applied to the 1983 mixed collateral loan was in fact payments
received on the revolving operating loan which, under the relevant
loan documents, could not have been applied to the 1983 mixed
collateral loan.
The case relied on by Bonneville, Carrier Brokers, Inc. v.
Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258 (Utah App. 1988), is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.

Specifically, the guaranty at

issue therein was a conditional guaranty which provided that the
creditor would first pursue the collateral, Coca-Cola, prior to
pursuing the guarantor. On those facts, the Utah Court of Appeals
appropriately held that the guarantor was not liable where the
monies guaranteed were in fact used to purchase fish, not CocaCola, since that was not the parties1 bargain.

Conversely, here

the language of the Guaranty Agreement provides that Bonneville
consents to "any and all substitutions, exchanges or releases of
all or any part of the collateral

therefore

. . .".

11 2.

Moreover, all that occurred by American taking the real property as
secondary security for the 1985 revolving operating loan was that
a lien was created against the real property junior to that imposed
by the 1983 Deed of Trust, so that the security for the 1983 mixed
collateral

loan was unaffected.

There was thus no material

modification of the Guaranty Agreement.
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C.

The subsequent revolving loan agreement did not result in a
novation.
Under Utah law, for a novation to occur, there must be:
(1) an existing
agreement to the
(3) a new valid
guishment of the
(Cites omitted.)

and valid contract, (2) an
new contract by all parties,
contract, and (4) an extinold contract by the new one.

Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1352-53 (Utah App. 1987).2

Under

this standard, it is clear that there is no novation as between
American and C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics or as between
American and Bonneville.

The subsequent revolving operating loan

was a distinct transaction, with separate security given, which in
no way was intended to or operated to extinguish any of the obligations undertaken by C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics under the
initial mixed collateral loan.

More significantly, there was no

subsequent agreement between American and Bonneville, the contracting parties under the guaranty.

As there was no novation as

between American and the primary obligors, or between American and
Bonneville, clearly then Bonneville has not been released from its
obligations under the Guaranty Agreement.
Bonneville alleges that the "novation" is evidenced by the
fact that American would not sell the Promissory Note and Deed of
The alleged case authority relating to novations cited by
Appellant in its brief, Crested Butte Silver Mine, Inc. v.
Candelaria Metals, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987) does not involve
or discuss the issue of a novation at all, but rather discusses the
legal doctrines of rescission and accord and satisfaction.
Accordingly, it is of no relevance to Appellant's argument
regarding novation.
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Trust to Bonneville.

(Appellant's Brief at 21-22.)

Not only is

that allegation irrelevant, but the record also demonstrates that
American at no time received an offer from Bonneville to purchase
the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust, although a preliminary
inquiry was made by Bonneville and responded to affirmatively by
American. There is thus no factual basis for Bonneville's novation
argument.

V.
THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE.
Summary judgment is properly granted if there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute and if the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The

material

facts

in

this

Bonneville executed the guaranty.
unconditional.

case

are

uncontroverted.

The guaranty is absolute and

Under the undisputable terms of the Guaranty

Agreement, American had no duty or obligation to pursue the real
and

personal

property

pledged

as

collateral

for

the

mixed

collateral loan. Without having an obligation to do so, American,
nonetheless, obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay and did
foreclose the real and personal property security.

American then

properly credited the proceeds therefrom against the balance owing
on the mixed collateral loan. The mixed collateral loan was not a
loan secured solely by a mortgage on real property.
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There is no factual basis for Bonneville's assertions that a
novation occurred, or that there was a material alteration of the
original contract.
question of fact.

Mere allegations do not suffice to create a
In addition, the other so-called disputed facts

alleged to exist by Bonneville -- that representations were made in
the

loan

commitment

which

would

result

in

no

liability

to

Bonneville and that American did not properly apply payments and
credits which served to release Bonneville -- are not factual
issues at all as those questions are clearly answered by reference
to the express unambiguous written terms of the relevant documents
relating to the loan transactions.

In particular, the loan

commitment was superseded by the terms of the Deed of Trust,
Promissory Note and Guaranty Agreement. And, the mixed collateral
loan documents and the revolving operating loan documents clearly
do not allow for application of payments and credits as urged by
Bonneville.
Having correctly found no genuine issues of material fact on
the issue of Bonnevillefs liability to American, the trial court
applied the appropriate law, found that the "one-action rule" did
not apply

and

granted

summary

judgment

for American

against

Bonneville on the issue of liability and denied Bonneville's cross
Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of American and against Bonneville on the
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issue of Bonneville's liability under the terms of the Guaranty
Agreement should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 1991.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

TEETBOYER
ANNELI R. SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following this 15th day of April, 1991:
Gerald M. Conder, Esq.
466 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Bonneville

Xl^^\
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GUARANTY AGREEMENT
This Guaranty, made this 28th day of October, 1983, by Bonneville
Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, ("Guarantor") and Levis E. Young,
individually, ("Additional Guarantor"), to and for the benefit of Aaerican
Savings and Loan Association, a Utah corporation, ("Beneficiary").
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Gibson Cryogenics, Inc., a Utah corporation, with C. John
Gibson, individually and as President and Lewis E. Young as Secretary/Treasurer,
("Debtor") has/have applied to the Beneficiary for a aortgage loan in the
aoount of One Million One Hundred Thousand and NO/100 Dollars ($1,100,000.00),
to be evidenced by its Promissory Note, ("Note"), in that aaount dated the 28th
day of October, 1983, secured by a Deed of Trust with Security Agreeaent and
Assignaent of Rents, ("Deed of Trust"), bearing the saae date as the Note; and
WHEREAS,'the Beneficiary is unwilling to sake said loan unless Guarantor
guarantees the payment of principal and interest, and any other charges provided for in the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument
securing the Note, and the performance by the Debtor of all the covenants
on its part to be performed and observed pursuant to the provisions thereof;
and
WHEREAS, Guarantor desires to give such guaranty to Beneficiary in
order to induce Beneficiary to make said loan;
NOV, THEREFORE, in consideration of the aforesaid premises, for the
purpose of inducing Beneficiary to make the aforementioned mortgage loan
to Debtor, and other good and valuable consideration, Guarantor hereby;
1. Unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the due and punctual
payment of the principal of the Note, the interest thereon and any other
monies due or which may become due thereon, and the due and punctual performance and observance by the Debtor of all the other terms, covenants and
conditions of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument
securing the Note, whether according to the present terms thereof, at an
earlier or accelerated date or dates as provided therein, or pursuant to
any extension of time or to any change or changes in the terms, covenants,
and conditions thereof now or at any time hereafter made or granted.
2. Waives diligence, presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, demand
for payment, extension of time of payment, notice of acceptance of this
Guaranty, nonpayment at maturity and indulgences and notices of every kind,
and consents to any and all forbearances and extensions of the time of payment of the Note, Deed of Trust or any other document or instrument securing
the Note, and to any and all changes in the terms, covenants and conditions
thereof hereafter made or granted and to any and all substitutions, exchanges
or releases of all or any part of the collateral therefore; it being the
intention hereof that Guarantor shall remain liable as principal until the
full amount of the principal of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document
or instrument securing the Note, with interest and any other sums due or to
become due thereon, shall have been fully paid and the terms, covenants and
conditions shall have been fully performed and observed by Debtor, notwithstanding any act, omission or thing which might otherwise operate as a legal
discharge of the Guarantor.
3. Agrees that he shall have no right of subrogation whatsoever with
respect to the aforesaid indebtedness, or to any monies due and unpaid thereon
or any collateral securing the same; unless and until Beneficiary shall have
received payment in full of all sums at any time secured by the Deed of Trust
or any other document or instrument securing the Note.
4. Agrees that this Guaranty may be enforced by Beneficiary without
first resorting to or exhausting any other security or collateral or without
first having recourse to the Note or any of the property covered by the Deed
of Trust or other document or instrument securing the Note through foreclosure
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GUARANTY
proceedings, trustee's sale or otherwise; provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall prevent Beneficiary froa suing on the Mote or foreclosing upon or initiating a trustee's sale under the Deed of Trust or other
document or instrument securing the Note or from exercising any other rights
thereunder; and, if such foreclosure, sale or other remedy is availed of
only the net proceeds therefrom, after deduction of all charges and expenses
of every kind and nature whatsoever, shall be applied in reduction of the amount
due on the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument securing
the Note, and Beneficiary shall not be required to prosecute or institute proceedings to recover any deficiency as a condition of payment hereunder or en*
dorsement hereof. At any sale of the security or collateral for the indebtedness or any part thereof, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, Beneficiary
may at its discretion purchase all or any part of such collateral so sold
or offered for sale for its own account and may apply against the amount
bid therefor the balance due it pursuant to the terms of the Note or Deed
of Trust or any other document or instrument securing the Note.
5. Agrees that in the event this Guaranty is placed in the hands of
an attorney for enforcement, the Guarantor will reimburse the Beneficiary
for all expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees, with or
without litigation having been filed, and if filed, including any attorney's
fees in any trial or appellate court.
6. Agrees that this Guaranty shall m u r e to the benefit of and may be
enforced by Beneficiary, and any subsequent holder and/or Beneficiary of the
Note and Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument securing the Note
and shall be binding upon and enforceable against the Guarantor and the
Guarantor's legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns.
7. Agrees that the indebtedness of Debtor to Beneficiary, covered
by this Guaranty shall be and the same hereby is declared to be orior to
any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against Debtor,
whether or not Debtor becomes insolvent, and Guarantor shall and does expressly
subordinate any such claim Guarantor may have against Debtor, upon any account
whatsoever, to any claim that Beneficiary has against Debtor based upon the
indebtedness covered by this Guaranty. In the event of insolvency and consequent liquidation of the assets of Debtor, through bankruptcy, by an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, by voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets
of Debtor applicable to the payment of the claims of both Beneficiary and
Guarantor shall be paid to Beneficiary and shall be first applied by Beneficiary to all claims which it may have or acquire against Debtor or any
assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of Debtor; provided that such assignment
shall be effective only for the purpose of assuring the Beneficiary full
payment of all indebtedness of Debtor to Beneficiary covered by this Guaranty.
8. Agrees that assignment by Beneficiary of all or part of the indebtedness covered by this Guaranty shall transfer to the assignee all benefits
of this Guaranty as to the portion of such indebtedness assigned. This Guaranty
shall remain m effect in favor of the Beneficiary as to the portion of such
indebtedness not assigned. Guarantor further agrees that if payment is made
by Debtor on the debt guaranteed hereby and thereafter Beneficiary is forced
to remit the amount of that payment to the Debtor trustee in bankruptcy or
similar person under any federal or state bankruptcy law or law for the relief of debtor, the Debtor debt shall be considered unpaid for the purpose
of enforcement of this Guaranty.
9. Agrees that notice by Beneficiary of the acceptance of this
Guaranty is hereby waived, and that this Guaranty may be assigned to any
holder of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument
securing the Note.
10c Agrees that no act or omission of any kind by Beneficiary shall
affect or impair this Guaranty, and Beneficiary shall have no duties to the
Guarantor.
11. Agrees that their obligations hereunder shall be absolute and
primary and shall be complete and binding upon this Guaranty being executed
by it and subject to no conditions precedent or otherwise.
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GUARANTY
12. Agrees that the terms of this Guaranty nay not be changed or
modified in any way except by a writing executed by the holder or Beneficiary of the Note, Deed of Trust, and any other document or instrument
securing the Note.
13. Agrees that this Guaranty shall be specifically enforceable by
the holder or Beneficiary of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document
or instrument securing the Note, in the event of a sale or transfer of the
collateral covered by the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument securing the Note, or any part of such collateral, which sale is an event of
default under the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument securing
the Note, even though such holder does not accelerate, in whole or in part,
the indebtedness so secured, and even though there is no right in such holder
to accelerate the indebtedness so secured, in whole or in part.
14. Agrees this Guaranty contains the full agreement of the Guarantor
and is not subject to any oral conditions.
15. Agrees that the obligations hereunder shall be continuing and irrevocable until said mortgage loan and all charges provided for in the Note,
Deed of Trust or other document or instrument securing the Note have been
completely satisfied and paid m full.
Each of the undersigned Guarantor and Additional Guarantor hereby consents
to and submits himself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah and agrees
that the Beneficiary under the aforementioned Note shall be entitled to a
judgement and decree and enforcement by the courts of the State of Utah for
any amount which may be adjudged to be paid to the Beneficiary by any such
court of the state, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees, interest
and reasonable costs. Further, the Secretary of State for the State of Utah
and his successors in the office shall be the agent f«r «*rvice *£ process
on the undersigned Guarantor and Additional Guarantor within the State of Utah
with respect to any such suit.
Copies of any legal process affecting the undersigned shall be forwarded to:
Bonneville Industries, Inc.
2893 Sunrise Boulevard
Suite #212
Rancho Cordova, California 95670

Levis E. Young
c/o Gibson Cryogenics, Inc.
9501 West 900 South, P.O. Box 2388
Ogden, Utah

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary written above, the undersigned
Additional Guarantor hereby unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the
performance of Bonneville Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, according
to and upon the same terms as contained in this Guaranty Agreement. It is
specifically understood by all parties to this agreement that Guarantor
guarantees said performance of Debtor and the Additional Guarantor guarantees
the performance of Guarantor only.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Guarantor and Additional Guarantor have executed this
instrument the day and year first above mentioned.
GUARANTOR:
BONNEVILLE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Nevada corporation

C^/V
>/* ^rh^^
Cary Ly*oun<, President

/

\ ,rsxsftn. rJW. VWrnrv
Cristy Ley YtfiingTSecretary
Q

ADDITIONAL GUARANTOR:
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